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[L. A. No. 20527. In Bank. Jan. 20, 191)0.]

TIMM AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Respondent., v. H. L.
BYRAM, as County Tax Collector, etc., at aI., Appellants; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervener.!
'la.xation-Bxemption~Federal Property and Agencie~Oon
tractors With United BtateB.~A state tax on the property or:
receipts of a private contraetor CIlnnot bc avoided on the i
doctrine of intergovernmental tin: immunity merely becaus(\ I
the United States eventually benrs the burden of the tax.
[2] 1d.-Bxemption~Federal Property and Agoncies-Oontrac-,
tors With United Btates.-In the absence of an 4:lxpru..;s con-!
gression:ll grant of immunity, n tax on a special bank deposit:
made by a corporation of mont.'Ys ndvlllleed to it under a cost- :
plus-a-fixed-fue contract with thl' United States may be avoided
only if the tax ill imposed on fedl'.r.u property or is so measured
by such property as to be in substllllce and effeet a tax thercon.
(3) ld.-Exemptions-Federal Property and Agoncioo-Oontractors With United Btat.es.-A oorporation which had entered
into a eost-plus-a-fi:s:ed-fec contrACt with the United States is
no less the owner of a special bnnk account for tax purposes
because the funds wore provided by the UnitllCl States pursuant.
to the contract r:1thur than by n privatnlpndcr.
.
(4] Id.-Exemption~Federal Property and Ageneie~ontrae-·
tors With United Btates.-Vvnerc a federnl statuto authorizes
advllDcc pllyn.ents on war contracts, title to the fund .. advanced
passes to the contrp.ctor and the United St4teb retains only
an equitable lien thereon superior to all other liens.

[1]

[1] Sec 24 Oal.Jur. 90; 51 Am.Jur. 301.
McX. Dig. References: [1-10] Taxation, § 86~
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l5] Id.-Exemptions-Federal Propert7 and Agencies-Oontractors With United 8tates.-Wbere an agreement by which advancPos wero paid by the United States to a private contractor
expressly gave the United States a lien on the funds superior
to al1 other liens to secure their repayment undor certain
contingencies, the title to such funds passed to the contr3ctor,
since the ownership of a lien on personal property precludes
legnl title in the lienor. (Civ. Code, § 2R88.)
[6] Id.-Exemptions-Federal Propert7 and Agencies-Oontractors With the United 8tates.-Wbere a corporation which had
entered into a eost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the United
Rtnt.ep was, wbjoot to approval of the government's contracting officer, to use a speci:tl bank deposit of moneys advanced
by tho United States "ns a revolving fund for carrying out
the purposes uf the pnncipnl eontrllct" to pay the ohIlgations
ntWcss:trily incurred in performing the contract that the corporation would otherwise !.lave had to pay from its general funds,
the obligntions to he paid wrre the corporation's, not those
of tho United Stntes.
[7] ld.-Exemptions-Federal Property and Agencies-Contractors With United 8ta~s.-The imposition by the United States
of reasonable restrictions on the use of property advanced to
a corporation under a contract, even the retention of legal
title to secure performance of an executory (!.()ntract, does not
make the United :;;tatcs the ownrr of that property for tax
purposes.
[8] Id.-Exemptions-Federal Propert7 and Agencies-Oontractors With United 8tates.-A provision in a government contract with a private contractor giving the United States the
right to cancel the contract and compel the return of all funds
advanced under it does not precludc the contractor from holding titlc or a ta:rable interest in such funds.
[9] ld.-Exemptions-Federal Propert7 and Agencies-Oontractors With United 8tates.-Tbe fact that a corporation which
had entered into a eost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the
United States could not use money advanced by the government for the eorporation's benefit, without prior approval by
the governmt:nt or its C"ontracting offieer, did not give the
corporation the status as agent of the government to pledge
its credit nor preclude the corporation from being the owner
of the money for tax purposes.
[10] Id.-Exemptions-Federal Property and Agencies-Oontractors With United 8tates.-A corporation which had entered
into a cost-plus-a-tixed-fee contract with the United States
could not avoid taxation on a special bank deposit of advance
payments made by the govt'rnment to the corporation, ou the
claim that its interest in the dt'poRit was valueless, where such

)

')

i

/

134

TIM:M: AIRCRAFT CORP. tI. BYRAM:

[34 C.2d

1
I
i

aeposit enabled the corporation to purchase the materials and \
hire the labor necessary to the performance of its contract,
for which it was to receive a substantial fee.
I

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior. Court of Los
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed.

i

I

Action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment for!
plaintiff rcversed.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Louis A. Babior, Deputy
City Attorney, Harold W. Kennedy. County Counsel, A.
Curtis Smith, Assistant County Counsel, and James A. Cobey,
Deputy County Counsel, for Appellants.

i
.;

Tom C. Clark, United States Attorn~y General, Theron
Lamar Caudle, Assistant United States Attorney General.
George A. Stinson, Berryman Green, Special Assistants to
the United States Attorney General, James M. Carter. United
States Attorney, Ronald Walker, Clyde C. Downing and
George M. Bryant, Assistant United States Attorneys, for
Respondent and Intervener.
TRAYNOR, J .-Defendants levied ad valorem taxes for
the year 1944-1945 on a bank deposit of plaintiff Timm Aircraft Corporation assessed to it as a solvent credit. Timm paid
the taxes under protest .and then brought this action to recover them, contending that the deposit was owned by the
United States and was constitutionally exempt from taxation
by a state or its subdivisions. Judgment was entered for
Timm, and defendants appeal.
Under a contra(!t with the War Department Timm manufactured military aircraft on a cost-plus-a-fixed-feebasis.
The contract provided that Timm was not an agent of the
United States but an independent contractor at all stages of
the manufacture, including the acquisition of materials and
the furnishing of labor. Title to all completed work was in
the United States and title to all material, equipment, and
supplies for which Timm was entitled to reimbursement vested
in the United States upon delivery to Timm. The United
States could elect to terminate the contract for Timm's failure
to prosecute the work with promptness and diligence or when
"conditions arise which make it advisable or neeessary in the
interest of the Government that work be discontinued under

)
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this contract." If the United States elected to terminate the
contract, it was obbgated to make full and prompt settlement
of Timm's claims for reimbursement of expenditures before
termination, and of all claims against Timm for obligations incurred by it in the performance of the contract.
To provide Timm with the necessary funds to perform the
contract, the United States by two supplemental agreements
rlat~d April 13, 1942, and March 13, 1943, agreed to make ady:mec payments to Timm of sums not to exceed the amount
r.pecified in the agreements. Timm was required to furnish
adequate security for tht> payments and to deposit the funds
in 8 special bank account or accounts "separate from the
contractor's general or other funds." The payments were to
be used "by the contractor exclusively as a revolving fund
for carrying out the purposes of the principal contract and
any amendments thereto and not for any other business of
the contractor." If the United States terminated the principal
contract, Timm was obligated to repay the balance remaining
in the account and the United States retained u a lien upon
such balances to secure the repayment of the advances, which
lien shall be superior to any lien of the bank or any other
pcrson upon such account or accounts." Withdrawals from
tht~ account were subject to previous approval by the contracting offieer or his representative to insure that the funds
would be withdrawn only for the purposes of the principal
contract.
Pursuant to these agreements three-party deposit agreements were executed by Timm, the United States, and the
California Bank of Los Angeles, under which the advance
payments were deposited to Timm's account, subject to the
terms of the supplemental agreements. Checks drawn on the
account had to be countersigned by the contracting officer,
whose signature indicated the requisite approval of the withdrawal. Timm periodically drew checks on the special aecount for the estimated amount of current expenditures.
Upon certification by Timm that the funds were to be used
for the specified purposes, the contracting officer countersigned
the checks. Timm then deposited these checks to its operating
account, from which it paid obligations incurred in the performance of the contract. Vouchers for these expenditure!!
were then forwarded to the contracting officer, and after
verification and approval the special account was replenished
in the amount of the funds so expended. At all times, thE
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amount of the special deposit, plus the amount in Timm ~~
operating account, and the aggregate amount of the outstand~
ing vouchers, was equal to the total advanced to Timm under
th~ agreements. The taxes were levied on the balance on
~
deposit in the special account on the tax day.
Dt>fcndants contend that the deposit was not the property'
of the United States, that it was owned by Timm, and that 1
Th!lJI1'S intcr('st in the funds deposited was of substantial '\
value to it. Upon examination of the agreements and the
statutes under which the advance payments were made, it I
is our conclusion that this contention is correct, and that th~:j
judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
~
[1] A state tax upon the property or receipts of a private':
cont:actor can no longer be avoided on the doctrine of inter~~'~
governmental t8.X immunity merely because the United States .'
eventually bears the burden of the tax. "The asserted right
of the one [government] to be free of taxation by the other
does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to
the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity."
(Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 [62 S.Ot. 43, 86
L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615] ; Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 116
[65 S.Ot. 157,89 L.Ed. 1071 ; Curry v. United States, 314 U.S ..
14, 18 [62 S.Ct. 48, 86 L.Ed. 9) ; James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160 [58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155, 114 A.L.R.
318] ; Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 G.S 514 [46 8.0t. 172
70 L.Ed. 384]; Kai..~er Co. v. Reid. 30 Oa1.2d 610. 628-629,
[184 P.2d 879].) [2] In the absence of an express con· ~
gressional grant of immunity, the tax in question may bel
avoided only if it is imposed on property of the United States •
or is so measured by such property as to be in substance \
and effect a tax thereon. (United States v. Allegheny County, '.
822 U.S. 174, 186 [64 S.Ct. 908, 88 L.Ed. 1209] ; see Powell, .f:
The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity, 58 Harv. •
L.Rev., 757, 773-787; c/., New York v United States, 326 ,
U.S. 572 [66 S.Ot. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326].)
[3] To perform its obligations under the contract, Timm
had to make large expenditures for labor and materials. It
could not have done so without outside help in view of the
time that would elapse before reimbursement. It could have
borrowed from a private lender on the strength of the contracts and deposited the money to its account to cover future
expenditures. Had it done so. it would clearly have been regarded as the owner of thp R""ount for tax purposes despite
V

\
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any obligation to use it only to finance its perfonnance of the
contract. Since interest charges on a private loan, however.
would have increased the cost of manufacture to the United
States, the Secretary of War chose to pay a part of the contract
price to Timm in advance of the expenditures. Timm is no
less the owner of the account for tax purposes because the
funds were provided by the United Btates rather than by
II private lender.
[4] In view of the prohibition of advances of public
funds (Rev. Btats. § 8648, 81 U.B.C.A. § 529), special statutory
authorization for payment of advances under war contracts
was necessary. Congress therefore authorized the making of
.. advance, progress and other payments upon such contracts
of any per centum of the contract price." (50 U.S.C.A. App.
§§ 611 [55 Stats. 839), 1151 [54 Stats. 676], 1171(c} [54
Stats. 712}; Exec. Order 9001 [6 Fed. Reg. 6787], §§ 1, 8.
Italics added.} Identical provisions in statutes authorizing
advance payments have been construed as authorizing passage
of title to the contractor as "payments of sums that are expected to become due on the contract, and in the ordinary
course of events do become due and are applied accordingly."
(Enright v. United States, 54 F.2d 182, 188; United 8tates v.
Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387 [45 S.Ct. 338, 69
L.Ed. 672).} The United States retains only an equitable
lien upon the funds superior to all other liens. ( U"ited Statu
v. Butterworth-Judson Corp .• supra, 893.)
[5] Moreover, the terms of the supplemental agreement
by which the advances were paid to Timm are eonsistent only
with a holding that title to the deposited funds pU<lrd
to Timm. The agreement expressly gave the United States
a lien upon the funds superior to any and all other liens to
secure their repayment under certain contingencies. The
ownership of a lien on personal property precludes lel!al
title in the lienor. (Civ. Code, § 2888; Standard Auto Sales
Co. v. Lehman, 43 Cal.App. 763, 766 [186 P. 178].) [6] Subject to the approval of the contracting officer, Timm was to
use the account "as a revolving fund for carrying out the
purposes of the principal contract," to pay the obligations
necessarily incurred in performing the contract that Timm
would otherwise have had to pay from its general funds. The
obligations to be paid were Timm's, not those of the United
States. The provisions by which Timm agreed to l'epa~' the
funds to the United States upon certain contingencies carry
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the implication that it was Timm and not the United Sta~~
that held title to those funds.
Plaintiff contends that the restrictions imposed upon the'
use of the funds are so general that Timm ('an not be said to
be their owner for tax purposes. 1'hf> restrictions relied upon'
are: (1) the limitation of the use of the deposil aecount to
the purposes of the principal contract; (2) the condition'
that withdrawals from the account be subject to previolls i
approval by the contracting officer to insure that the fundsl
be used only for those purposes; (3) the condition that the~
funds musl be returned to the United States in the event it~
chose to cancel the principal contract. [7] The impositiori~
of reasonable restrictions upon the use of property, even:~
the retention of legal title to secure performance of an ~~,~
ecutory contract, does not make the United States the owner1
of that property for tax purposes. (S.R.A., Inc. v. MinnesottJ,~
327 U.S. 558, 570 [66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851] ; Eisley v, Mohan~i
31 Ca1.2d 637, 643 [192 P.2d 5J; Dept. of Veterans' Affair'~
v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Ca1.2d 657 [192 P.2d 22J ; Kaiser~
Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 625 [184 P.2d 879].) "The form"':
of the transfer is immaterial; the determinative question ii~
whether private rights have supplanted those of the govern-:,
ment insofar as the use of the property is concerned. " (Eisley'
v. Mohan, 31 Ca1.2d 637, 643 [192 P.2d 5].) There can be 1
DO doubt here that it was Timm that used the property. It~
decided what materials were to he acquired, the source ()f~~
their acquisition and terms of payment therefor, the wages:;4
to be paid and the method of their payment. The United;
States retained the right of supervision only to insure that';
the funds would not be used for purposes foreign to the'~
principal contract but would "serv[e] their highest and'~
best use." This limitation does not affect their ownership. 1
(Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610,625 [184 P.2d 879].)
'~
[8] The provision giving the United States the right to 1
cancel the principal contract and compel the return of the
funds is common to all war contracts in recognition of the
contingency of a sudden termination of the war. The advances in United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267
U.S. 387, 389 [45 S.Ct. 338, 69 L.Ed. 672], were subject to
• the limitation that "The United States reserved the right to
cancel the agreement at any time that its need for the plant
• or output ceased." Despite that limitation the court found
that the private contractor held the title to the deposit account.
A similar provision in Alabama v. King «t Boozer, 314 U.s.
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1 [62 S.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ell. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615], did not make the
contractor the purchasing agent of the United States even
though the United States was to reimburse the contractor for
the purchase price of materials bought by the contractor and
would have to pay the sales tax whose levy thereon the court
sustained. In Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d
879], this court sustained an ad valorem tax on the interest
of the plaintiff in land and shipyard facilities leased to it by
the United States. It was contended that the plaintiff had
no taxable interest therein because of the reservation by the
lessor of the right to cancel the contracts and retake possession
of the yards at its election. This court rejected that contention, stating that this reservation was designed only to
"protect the government in case of a short war or plaintiffs'
inability to construct vessels properly. So pertinent in this
regard is the testimony of the regional counsel for the commission before the boards of equalization: 'In fighting a war,
of course, the only reason for changing a contractor-that
is, that would be justifiable-would be that the contractor
wasn't doing his job.' " (30 Cal.2d 610, 619.) This holding
is equally persuasive here.
(9] It is contended that the present case is distinguished
by the fact that the contractor was not free to use the money
without prior approval by the government, and that this requirement of prior approval places the fund under the ownership and control of the government. It is not unusual for a
creditor who advances money for a specified purpose to require
as a condition of the advance that all expenditures be subject
tc his approval to insure their being made only for that purpose. The situation is analogous to that presented to the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 [62 S.Ct. 43,86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615].
The United States entered into a contract with a builder to
construct an Army camp in Alabama on a cost-plus-a-fixed-feebasis. The builder was to be reimbursed for the cost of all
material purchased, and title to the purchased materials
vested in the United States upon delivery. All purchases
were subject to the prior approval of the contracting officer,
in the same manner and for the same purpose as in the present case. The builder purchased lumber from King and
Boozer with the approval of the contracting officer for use
under the principal contract. Alabama's effort to collect a
sales tax on the transaction was resisted on the theory that

TIMM AIRCRAFT CORP. V. BYRAM
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the builder pm'chased the materials as agent of the United
States and that the tax was illvalid b('callse it was levied upon
a purchase by the United States. [f the right of prior approval of the manner in which expenditures are made constitutes ownership of the funds expended, it would follow
that purchases made with that approval are made by the purchaser as agent of the one whose approval must be secured.
That contention, however, was rejected:
"But however extensively the Government may have reserved the right to restrict or control the action of the contractors .. neither the reservation nor the exercise of that
power gave the contractors the status of agents of the Government to enter into contracts er to pledge its credit." (314
U.S. 1, 13; Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14, 18 l62 S.Ct.
48, 86 L.Ed. 9].) The reasonlllg of the court is clearly applicable to the present case and compels the conclusion that Timm
was in fact the owner of the funds
[10] Timm als0 contends that even if it has a property
interest in the deposit, that interest is of no value to it. On
the contrary, it was of substantial value to it. It enabled
Timm to purchase the materiats and hire the labor necessary
to thp performanct' of its contract, for which it was to receive
a substantial fee. Had its general funds on hand been adequate, it could hardly have avoided taxation thereof by contt'nding that they were valueless to ~t because they were used
only for the performance of the government contract. As this
court stated in Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610, 625 [184 P.2d
879], where plaintiff urged thl:lt its interest in property leased
from the United States had no value because no profit was
directly derived from its use. "even assuming that plaintiff
did not make any 'profit' out of the shipyards as such. but
only out of its' services' in performlllg the construction work,
that fact would net negative the propriety of an assessment
hased on its' bent'ficial use' of the property as an entrepreneur
rng-aged in the management of 11 business enterprise. Plaintiff
had a property interest in the shipyards by virtue of its' exrlusive use and possession' thereof.
"That reasoning
applies with equal force here.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence. J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-In my opinion, the special bank account
was the property of the Uniterl States government, and therp-

)
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fore erroneously taxed as belonging to Timm Aircraft. Tht>
fact that the United States government could have the funds
in the account returned to it at any time when, ". . . in the
opinion of the Chief of the Air Corps, or his duly authorizt>d
representative, the unobligated balance of the advance payments made by the Government . . . exceeds the amount
necessary for the current needs of the Contractor, as determined by the Chief of the Air Corps, or his duly authorized
representative. . . . " (Supplemental Agreement, No.1. line
89) is inconsistent with any other view.
However I cannot agree that the aircraft company followed
the proper procedure in seeking relief under sections 51365143 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The mode of recovery for taxes erroneously or illegally collected from one
not the owner of the taxed property is specified by sections
5096-5107 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Timm Aircraft
did not comply with these sections. It filed no claim for refund, as the statute requires and, for that reason, is not entitled to recover the amount which it paid.
The first question for determination in measuring the corporation's right to recover is whether the payment made by
it was a voluntary one. As stated by Mr. Justice Shenk in
Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal.2d
1,7,8 [97 P.2d 963] : "It is the settled law of this state that
illegal taxes voluntarily paid may not be recovered by the
taxpayer in the absence of a statute permitting a refund
thereof; and in the absence of such statute only illegal taxes
paid under duress, coercion or compUlsion are considered
to have been involuntarily paid and therefore recoverable
... [T]he filing of a protest with a payment of illegal taxes
otherwise voluntarily made does not deprive the payment of
its voluntary character. [Citing Brumagim v. Tillinghast,
18 Cal. 265, 269, 271, 275 [79 Am.Dec. 176J; and other
authorities]." To the same effect is Security Nat. Bank v.
Young (C.C.A. 8th), 55 F.2d 616, 619 [84 A.L.R. 100].
In deciding the Brumagim case, supra, page 271, this court
said: ., The illegality of the demand paid constitutes of itself
no ground for relief. There must be, in addition, some
compulsion or coercion attending its assertion, which controls
the conduct of the party making the payment. . . . If he voluntarily pay an illegal demand, knowing it to be illegal, he
is of course entitled to no consideration; and if he voluntarily
II C.Jd-ll
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pay such demand in i~n()ranee or misapprl'hrnsion of the
law respl'cting- its valillity. hI' is in' no hl'ttl'r position. for
it would be against thE' highest policy to permit transactions
to be opened upon grounds of this charaeter." The later
dE'I'isions were reviewed at lE'ngth in the Southern Service
case. Uniformly they hold that a payment of taxes under
the circumstancE's shown by the present record. although
macle under protest, is a voluntary one.
Statutory authority for the refund of taxes "erroneously or
illegally colleetE'd" dates from 1872 when the Legislature
enacted section 3804 of the Political Code. As later amended,
and in effect for many years, it allowed a refund only llpon
a claim, verified by the person who paid the tax, and filed
within three years thereafter.
In 1893, the Legislature enacted section 3819 of the Political
Code. rt declared that" ... the owner of any property assessed . . . who may claim that the assessment is void in whole
or in part, may pay the same to the tax collector under protest,
and when so paid under protest, the payment shall in
no case be regarded as voluntarily payment." By other provisions of the section. "And such owner may at any time within
six months after such payment bring an action against
the county, . . . to recover back the tax so paid under protest; .
"
~ections 5096 to 5107 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
ha\'e continued in effect the provisions of section 3804 of the
Political Code. The Legislature also placed in section 5136
et seq., of the new code, the procedure authorized by section
3819 of the Political Code, allowing a property owner to pay,
under protest, the amount of a tax and then sue to recover
it. But now, as at the time the legislation was included in
the Political Code. the statutes apply to different situations.
Section 5096 et seq., of the Revenue and Taxation Code do
not limit to an owner of property the right to recover a tax
.. erroneously or illegally collected. " However, theyreq uire,
as did the predecessor statute, the filing, within a specified
time, of a verified claim by the person who paid the ta.x..
The later statutes based upon section 3819 of the Politif:al
Colie, by their terms, relate only to a "property owner."
This uistinetioll was expressly recognized in Warren v. San
FranC1SCQ, 150 Cal. 167 [88 P. 712], which held: "Section
3819 [now sections 5136-5143, Revenue and Taxation Code]
has no application. That section provides that the 'own'!!r'
of at.:.y property assessed, who may claim that the assessmflut
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is void, may pay his tax under protest, specifying the grounds
of the protest; and that when so paid under protest the payment shall not be regarded as voluntary. The plaintiff herein
was not the' owner' of the land assessed nor of any land bordering or adjoining that portion of Caroline Street . . . ."
This application of the statute has been recognized and
adopted by the Federal Court of Appeals of the 9th Circuit (Southern Calif. Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 13 F.2d 814, 819),
and also by the United States Supreme Court (Southern Calif.
Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 275 U.S. 393,399 [48 S.Ct. 180, 72 L.Ed.
329)). In the latter case, Mr. Justice McReynolds said:
., Section 3819 gives a remedy to the owner; and Warren v.
San Francisco, 150 Cal. 167 [88 P.712], intimates quite
strongly that it applies only to actual owners."
It is difficult to see how any conclusion other than that
stated in the Warren case logically can be reached, considering the language used by the Legislature. One remedy
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5096-5107) If open to any person, including an owner. who pays a taX "-:!rroneously or illegally collected " and thereafter files a verified claim for refund within
the specified time. The board of supervisors is authorized to
allow such a claim when the facts justify that action. The
other procedure (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5136-5143) is applicable
only to ". . . any property owner . . ." (§ § 5136, 5139). He
is not required to file claim, and relief may be given to him
only by judgment of i-he superior court in an action brought
within six months after payment of the tax.
I see no valid reason for departing from the construction
of a tax statute unanimously placed upon it by the justices
of this court in the Warren case 40 years ago and not since
challenged. The restriction of the legislation as applying
only to "an owner" has been left unchanged by the Legislature,
although the statute has been amended in other particulars.
Moreover, the decision has been accepted by the Federal
Court of Appeals and also by the UnIted States Supreme Court
as the law of this state.
Timm Aircraft consistently has maintained that on tax
day it was not the owner of the money assessed to it. However,
it did not comply with the essential requirements laid down
by the Legislature for a nonowner of property who pays a
tax erroneously or illegally collected from him. It fileu no
claim for refund within the time specified, and for that reason
it is not entitled to recover.
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I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal solely upon
the ground that the taxpayer did not follow the procedure
entitling it to a refund.
t
CARTER, J.-J dissent.
The majority opinion holds that the taxing agencies of this i
state may tax funds which the United States government baa.~
allocated for the payment of obligationlS tIue contractors on~~
government work before ~e. governmen~ has released control ~
of such funds, thus permIttIng the taxlDg of funds actuallyl
owned and t!ontrolled by the United States government. hi
my opinion such holding is in direct violation of the estab-(
Jished rule of reciprocal immunity against the taxation by'
either the state or federal government of property owned by
the other. (McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 [4 L.Ed."
579]; United States v. Allegl.eny County, 322 U.S. 174 [64 .'.
S.Ct. 908. 88 L.Ed 1 2 0 9 ] . ) ' i
A brief statemeut of the facts will suffice. On tax day. the:
first Monday in March, 1944, plaintiff, a corporation, was ~
engaged in the business of producing military aircraft, and ,,'
as such it had a contract to manufacture aircraft for the
United States dated April 7, 1942, referred to as a "cost-plusa-fixed fee" contract. Thereunder the plaintiff was to be
paid by the government, as lin independent contractor, the
costs of production plus a fixed fee. In order to provide plaintiff with capital to conduct its operations, supplemental agreements were made undE:'r which it was provided that thE:' United
States was to "makt' advance payments" within the limits
stated, security for which was to be furnished by plaintiff;
that such payments should be deposited in a special bank ac-:
count which was to be kept separate from plaintiff's general"
or other funds; that the balance in such account or accounts
shOUld be used "by the contractor exclusively as a revolving
fund for carrying out the purposes of the principal contract
and any amendments thereto and not for other business of the
contractor"; that withdrawa18 from such special account or
accounts should "be made subject to the prior written approval of the contracting officer or his duly authorized representative"; that any balances in such account or accounts
. should "secure the repayment of the advances" and that the
government should "have a lien upon such balances to secure
the repayment of such advances, which lien shallbe superior to any lien of the ban), or any other person upon such
account or accounts by virtue of assignment to it of such con-
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tract or otherwise"; that the bank should not be liable "for
the withdrawal of any funds from said special account upon
checks, properly endorsed and signed by the contractor, except that after the receipt by the bank of written directions
from the Chief of the Air Corps, or his duly authorized rep"csentative, the bank shall act thereon and be under no
liability to any party hereto for any action taken in accordance
with the said written directions"; that any excess money
should be "repaid by the contractor to the Government"
under certain circumstances specified in the contract; that
in the event of cancellation of the principal contract the
contractor should "return to the Government" the unliquidated balance of any advance payment; that in the event
it was determined that the advance payments exceeded the
amount necessary for the current needs of the contractor,
the excess should "be promptly returned to the Government."
Pursuant to the agreement, arrangements were maue with
a bank wherein it was agreed that a special account in plaintiff's name was to be set up for the advances and paid out in
accordance with the agreements. The government advised
the bank that no checks drawn on the account by plaintiff
were to be honored unless countersigned by the named federal
officer.
On the first Monday in March, 1944, there was $453,353.43
in the account and the defendant county of Los Angeles
levied an ad valorum property tax thereon against plaintiff
of $453.35, which it paid under protest.
Plaintiff and intervener, United States, claim and the trial
court found, that the account belonged to the government
and plaintiff had no taxable interest therein, and that if it
had an interest, such interest was of no value to plaintiff; that
therefore the account was illegally taxed to plaintiff.
Whether or not the account (the debt of the depository
bank) belonged to the government or to plaintiff depends
upon the agreements. The basic cost-plus-fixed-fee contract
provides that advance payments "may" be made when the federal officer" deems such action necessary," and if made shall be
in terms prescribed by the officer. The government may terminate the contrac! at any time. Under the supplemental
agreements, it is provided that advances shall be made and a
special account created, but also that " Withdrawals from
such special account or accounts shall be made subject to the
prior written approval of the Contracting Officer or Ais duly
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authorized representative." If the amount in the account l
exceeds, "in the opinion" of the federal officer, the amount I
necessary, the excess must be returned to the government \
and under the special account agreement with the bank, the
money is to be paid out as set forth in the agreements.
\
The foregoing provisions of the agreements point unerringly i
to the conclusion of the trial court that there was no vestige \
or incident of ownership in plaintiff of the special account. \
Contrasted with the facts here are the circumstances present \
in Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d 879], where this 1
court repeatedly stressed the right of I I exclusive possession" \
held by a lessee from the United States, and it was that right 1\
of possession upon which the tax was levied. While it is true I
that the United States was to have a lien on the account, which 1
indicates lack of ownership in it, that the account stood on i
the bank's records in plaintiff's name but only nominally, '
and that the moneys deposited in the account were spoken
of as I I advances," yet withdrawals from the account were
wholly under the control of the government. Plaintiff did
not have the right of use, possession, or title, all incidents of
ownership. The exercise by it of any of those prerogatives
of ownership was completely under the control of the United
States. Therefore, plaintiff had no interest equitable or legal
in the account and likewise it was not a solvent credit belonging to it. To be such a credit, it would have to be payable
to plaintiff without any strings or conditions attached. It
is apparent that the "advances" to the account were not
really advances as ordinarily understood, that is, a payment
before due date, for they were not payments to plaintiff
inasmuch as that would imply possession and right to use the
sums paid. But the account was then not usable by plaintiff
without the prior permission of the government. An advance,
as that term is ordinarily used, was thus not made until
withdrawals had been made from the account. Then and then
only was a payment made. The account was a mere field
or local arrangement whereby the government had the funds
on the spot where needed, thus facilitating their disbursement
at a time when fast action was of the essence.
The cases relied upon by Justice Traynor are not in point.
In Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d 879], as above
stated, the contractor leasing from the government was in
possession of the property and had the right of exclusive use
thereof. Here, Timm is neither in possession of the account,
nor does it have any right of use unless the government 80
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wishes, let alone an exclusive right. In Enright v. United
States, 54 F.2d 182, the advance payments had already been
made to the contractor. They were not in an account over
which the government had control. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U.S. 387 [45 S.Ct. 338, 69 L.Ed. 6721
is clearly distinguishable. The payments were there made
to the contractor, thus title passed. They were not in an account
under the government's control. In Alabama v. King & Boozer,
314 U.S. 1 [62 S.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615], the sole
question was whether a contractor was an agent for the govern·
ment when it purchased property to fulfill its contract with
the government, the title to which passed to the latter on acquisition, and thus whether a sales tax on the sale of the property
was valid. Plainly, the property was purchased by the contractor for his use in fulfilling his contract, and thus it was
a sale to him and hence taxable. For illustration, it is said
immediately following the quotation therefrom by Justice
Traynor: "It can hardly be said that the contractors were
not free to obligate themselves for the purchase of material
ordered. The contract contemplated that they should do 80
and that the Government should reimburse them for their
expenditures. It is equally plain that they did not assume
to bind the Government to pay for the lumber by their order,
approved by the Contracting Officer, which stipulated that
it did not bind or purport to bind the Government. The
circumstance that the title to the lumber passed to the Government on delivery does not obligate it to the contractor's vendor
under a cost-plus contract more than under a lump sum contract . . . We cannot say that the contractors were not, or
that the Government was, bound to pay the purchase price,
or that the contractors were not the purchasers on whom the
statute lays the tax." [Emphasis added.] In the instant case
the account was not Timm's for it could not be used except
upon the approval of the government.
It is urged by appellant, and Mr. Justice Edmonds holds,
that the instant action cannot be maintained by plaintiff
because it fails to qualify under the statute permitting an
action to recover taxes paid under protest by the owner of
the property erroneously assessed. Plaintiff did not proceed
under the claim for refund provisions of the statute. Its
action is pursuant to the following provision: "After taxes
are payable, any property owner may pay the taxes on his
property under protest. A payment under protest is not a
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voluntary payment." (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5136.) Section
5137 of that code authorizes the action when the tax is paid
under protest, and the following section reads: "The action
may be brought only: (a) As to the portion of the assessment
claimed to be void. (b) On the grounds specified in the protest.
(c) By the owner, his guardian, executor, or administrator."
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5139.) The refund provisions authorize
the making of a claim for refund to the board of supervisors
(Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 5096-5097), and an action by the taxpayer if the claim is disallowed. (id .. 5103)
There are various considerations which clearly point to
the conclusion that the word "owner" as used in the provisions
for recovering a tax paid under protest (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 5136 et seq., supra), must be interpreted to include a person
who both paid the tax and is the one against whom the assessment was levied. The remedies by way of claim for refund
and payment under protest are cumulative. (Brill v. County
of Los Angeles, 16 Ca1.2d 726 [108 P.2d 443] ; Birch v. County
of Orange, 186 Cal. 736 [200 P. 647]; Stewart etc. Co. v.
County 0/ Alameda, 142 Cal. 660 [76 P. 481].) Statutory
authority for the recovery of a tax levied pursuant to a void
assessment paid under protest is "befitting to this more enlightened age" (Hellman v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 147 Cal.
653, 655 [82 P. 313]), and, being remedial in nature, should
be given a liberal construction. (See Hellman v. City 0/ Los
Angeles, supra; Stewart etc. Co. v. County 0/ Alameda, supra;
Brenner v. Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 72 [116 P. 397].) The relief
afforded by the payment under protest provisions takes the
place of an action for money had and received, eliminating
the common law requirement of payment under duress.
(Aalwyn's Law [nst. v. San Francisco, 39 Cal.App. 414 [179
P. 220].) The person against whom the assessment is made.
and the person who paid the tax, is the one who has. a claim
for money had and received inasmuch as he was the payer.
If such a person may not recover, then there is no recovery
under the payment under protest method, for a person against
whom the tax was assessed ami who paid it. although not the
owner of the property assessed, would never be the owner
and would not have the remedy. That is clearly contrary
to the .liberal spirit of such provisions and would deny what
they permit, an action to recover taxes paid under protest
where the assessment is void. (See, Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 5137(a), § 5139(a), 514l.) The county asserted that plaintiff
was the owner of the account and as far as the assessment goes,

)

Jan. 1950)

PEOPLE V. UNIVERSAL Fn.M BXClJANGES

649

(34 C.ld 649: 213 P.2d 6971

it was declared to be the owner.l conclude, therefore, that an
assessee of property who pays the tax levied thereon undE"r
protest has an action to recover when the assessment was
void for lack of ownership in the taxpayer.
The case of Warren v. San Francisco, 150 Cal. 167 (88 P.
712), relied upon by Justice Edmonds. is not controlling.
There the taxpayer was wholly and entirely a volunteE"r He
paid taxes on property which was not assessed to him and in
which he had no vestige of an interest. It was a part of a
public street. Moreover, that case failed to give the liberal
construction required.
.
Being convinced that the money in the account here involvE"d
was not taxable, and that plaintiff pursued the proper rE"nwdy
for its recovery, I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Schauer, J., concurred.

